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Abstract 
Exploration is a costly activity that helps a business improve their understanding of a potential 
mineral deposit.  Yet, even with strong exploration results, the business faces uncertainty over 
the value of the mine.  I model this situation as a game of chance.  The game starts by giving an 
agent an asset with random value and ends when the agent chooses to accept the random value or 
reject it and receive zero instead.  The agent can pay to learn more about the asset’s value as 
many times as they like before they end the game, but no amount of exploration will remove all 
uncertainty.  I provide a decision rule for the agent based on an interval estimate for the asset 
value and analyze performance of the decision rule in a simulation experiment. 
Keywords:  Mineral exploration, game theory, learning, simulation. 
 JEL Classification:  C02, C44, C63, C70, D83, Q39.  
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Mineral exploration as a game of chance 
1. Introduction 
Exploration helps a mining company determine the potential value of a mineral deposit, but a 
mine may not be as profitable in production as expected from exploration results.  Any number 
of things could be at fault, such as changes in commodity prices or problems with mine 
operations.  However, the fundamental situation is of interest to economists: a company pays for 
information about the value of a deposit then decides whether to develop the deposit or not.  I 
describe this as a problem of decision making under uncertainty with learning and analyze it as a 
game of chance. 
Although there is extensive research on mineral exploration by economists, the standard 
approaches do not model the problem as a game of chance (Cairns, 1990).  Pindyck (1980) and 
Arrow and Chang (1982) are amongst the first authors to include uncertainty in models of 
mineral exploration.  They use dynamic programming to solve general equilibrium models, 
which have appealing theoretical properties but generate some unrealistic results (Cairns, 1990, 
p.369).  Cairns and Quyen (1998) contribute to this literature with a model that allows for 
learning about deposits based on spatial correlation.  Furthermore, Cairns and Quyen discuss 
their results in terms of a tradeoff between exploitation of existing deposits and exploration for 
new ones, which is a fundamental concept in mineral economics (Adelman, 1970). 
The tradeoff between exploitation and exploration also appears in the multi-arm bandit 
problem, which is important in computational science and machine learning (Brown & Smith, 
2013).  In the multi-arm bandit problem, an agent chooses how to play several different slot 
machines with unknown odds; the agent faces a tradeoff between exploiting machines with good 
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odds and exploring for machines with better odds.  This is a classic example of decision making 
under uncertainty with learning.  Researchers in decision theory have used the multi-armed 
bandit problem to develop industrial strength tools for mineral exploration, such as Bickel and 
Smith (2006).  Bickel and Smith determine the optimal order to drill six different holes 
depending on the success or failure in each hole.  They treat exploration as a sequential process 
that can exploit spatial correlation of drill holes, which is particularly well suited to exploration 
in oil and gas deposits.   
My approach to the topic is unique in the research literature because I model exploration as a 
game of chance.  The game is simple: nature offers an economic agent a contract with random 
value, then the agent pays for information about that value until they are ready to accept or reject 
the contract.  My model does not have the standard features of an economic model, such as 
measures of economic welfare or resource scarcity, nor standard features from decision theory, 
such as spatial correlation (Bickel and Smith, 2006).  Instead, I aim to introduce a toy model that 
can reveal important aspects of decision making under uncertainty with learning. 
Furthermore, my approach is unique because I analyze the toy model using tools from 
computational economics.  In particular, I suppose that the agent acts according to a particular 
decision rule rather than utility maximization.  This approach can be controversial because it is 
not necessarily optimal or rational, but it is influential in computational economics.  Hommes 
(2013) provides a comprehensive review of the value of this approach in modeling financial 
markets.  Hommes shows that simple decision rules can produce a variety of phenomenon in 
simulation that match stylized empirical facts, and even match patterns observed in experiments 
better than standard economic models.  My paper aims to promote the use of computational 
economics for modeling business decision making in mineral exploration. 
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2. Model 
2.1  General Model 
I introduce the mineral exploration game in Figure 1.  Nature starts the game by drawing a 
random value X from the initial distribution F0().  The agent knows the initial distribution, but 
not the particular value of X.  At each round of the game, the agent can choose yes, no, or 
explore.  The game ends when the agent picks yes or no.  If they pick yes, then they get X.  If 
they pick no, then they get zero with certainty.  Since the value X can be greater or less than 
zero, there is potential for risk or reward in picking yes versus no.   
I denote the total number of times that the agent explores before they decide as n.  Each 
round of exploration costs the agent c, but allows them to update their assessment of the 
probability distribution for the value to the posterior distribution Xi~Fi().  I denote the net profit 
that the agent earns at the end of the game as π.  If the agent picks yes, then π=X-nc.  If no, then 
π=-nc.  I do not include a time value of money.  
 
I analyze the model by assuming the agent uses a decision rule at each stage of the game.  
The decision rule is based on a vector of statistics Θi calculated from the distribution Fi().  I 
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define a set of values for the statistics that causes the agent to choose yes ΘY, no ΘN, or explore 
ΘE.  The decision rule is simply: if Θi in ΘY then pick yes; if Θi in ΘN then pick no; else explore 
again. 
In this paper I use a decision rule based on an interval estimate of the value X.  Let 
Θi={QL,QU} where QL is the lower quartile, Fi(X≤QL)=0.25, and QU is the upper quartile, 
Fi(X≤QU)=0.75.  I define the set ΘY={QL,QU:0<QL<QU}, ΘN={QL,QU:QL<QU<0}, and 
ΘE={QL,QU:QL<0<QU}.  According to this decision rule, the agent picks yes when the lower 
quartiles is positive or, in other words, when X is positive at 75% confidence level.  The agent 
picks no when X is negative with 75% confidence level.  The agent chooses to explore again 
when neither condition is satisfied or, in other words, when the 50% confidence interval for X 
contains zero.   
2.2  Probability model 
In this section I describe how to generate the posterior distribution of value X after one round 
of exploration.  Suppose the initial probability model is X0~U(a0,b0).  After one round of 
exploration, the distribution becomes X1~U(a1,b1).  The new values (a1,b1) must satisfy several 
conditions.  First, the new values cannot exclude the true value, a1<X< b1. Second, the distance 
between the new values must be 10% smaller than the initial model, as in Equation (1).   
(1)  (b1-a1)=0.9(b0-a0) 
In order for the new values (a1,b1) to tighten the distribution around the true value, they must 
increase the lower bound a0<a1 and decrease the upper bound b1< b0.  I ensure this by 
constructing the new values as in Equation (2), which include two new variables ea,eb>0. 
(2) a1=a0+ea;  b1=b0-eb 
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I combine Equations (1) and (2) to get a constraint on the values of ea and eb in Equation (3).   
(3) ea+eb=0.1(b0-a0) 
I draw a random value for ea from uniform distribution, ea~U(0,0.1(b0-a0)), then calculate eb 
from Equation (3).  Based on ea and eb, I calculate (a1,b1) from Equation (2) and check the 
condition a1<X< b1.  This procedure ensures that the new distribution U(a1,b1) will be more 
tightly concentrated around true value X.  I assume the agent uses the new distribution 
X1~U(a1,b1) to make their next decision.  The agent calculates the statistics Θ1 from the new 
distribution and determines if the agent is ready to make a decision yet.  If Θ1 in ΘY, then they 
pick yes.  If Θ1 in ΘN, then they pick no.  Else, they do another round of exploration and update 
the distribution again based on the procedure described this section. 
2.3  Results  
I specify the parameters in the model to ensure that the cost of exploration is low relative to 
the potential value of the mine, cost c=0.01 and initial bounds a0=-1, b0=1.  This means the true 
value has a uniform distribution, X~U(-1,1).  I allow the agent to play the game 100,000 times 
and calculate the distribution for key variables associated with the decision rule.  
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Figure 2 show the distribution for the number of times that the agent chooses exploration 
before they pick yes or no.  It shows that the agent needs at least five rounds of exploration 
before they make a decision, which is expected based on the construction of the model and in 
line with industry standards for mineral exploration.  The figure also shows that the agent 
sometimes need as many as 50 rounds to decide!  The long tail for this distribution is due to the 
fact that the quantile-based decision rule has a hard time distinguishing the sign of small values: 
if X is close to zero, then the confidence interval must be very small before it will be entirely 
above or below zero.  Thus, it may be optimal for the agent to give up on projects after many 
rounds of exploration because the value X is likely to be small. 
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Figure 3 shows the distribution for net profit π.  The figure shows that profits have an 
asymmetric distribution with positive skew. The large probability of large positive profits and the 
small probability of large negative profits is a desirable feature.  However, the large probability 
of small negative profits shows that there is some risk associated with the exploration game. 
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Figure 4 shows the conditional distribution of the true value of X given that the agent picks 
yes or no at the end of the game.  The symmetry in the two distributions is due to the symmetry 
in the agent’s decision rule.  The two distributions overlap around zero because it is difficult for 
the quantile-based decision rule to distinguish between small positive or negative values.  The 
results also show that the decision rule is able to effectively distinguish between large positive or 
negative values for X.   
3. Discussion 
In this paper I describe mineral exploration as a game of chance, where an agent can pay for 
information to improve their knowledge of the value of a mineral deposit.  I introduce a decision 
rule to determine when the agent stops exploring and decides to build the mine or not.  I explore 
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the behavior of the decision rule in simulation and find that the decision rule has desirable 
features, such as positive skew in the distribution of profits. 
The model can be changed in several ways.  For one, it is possible to change the probability 
model for the true value to allow for correlation across different rounds of the game.  For 
another, it is possible to compare different versions of the decision rule; if the decisions were 
based on the 25% and 95% quantiles, then the agent would require higher confidence to pick yes 
and have higher accuracy when the true value is positive.  An interested reader could even 
compare different decision rules based on some measure over the distribution of profit, such as a 
utility function.  Finally, it is possible to introduce different parties, such as management and 
financier.  If these two parties update their distributions about the value in different ways after 
each round of exploration, then the model could provide a way to explore principal-agent 
problems in context of decision making under uncertainty with learning.   
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Appendix 
%%  Code Appendix – Mineral Exploration game  
%   Written by Peter Bell, February 5 2014 
% 
% 
%%  Section 1:  Specify global parameters  
%    
clear all; 
numLoop=0;  cost=1/100;  aTrue=-1;  bTrue=1;    decisionVar=0; 
xTrue=aTrue+(bTrue-aTrue)*rand(); 
  
%%  Section 2:  Loop over many rounds of exploration 
numGames=100000; 
for iGame=1:numGames 
    numLoop=0;  decisionVar=0; 
    xTrue=aTrue+(bTrue-aTrue)*rand(); 
    aLoop=aTrue;    bLoop=bTrue; 
    while decisionVar==0 
        numLoop=numLoop+1; 
        quantLow=aLoop+0.25*(bLoop-aLoop); 
        quantUp=aLoop+0.75*(bLoop-aLoop); 
  
        if 0<quantLow & 0<quantUp 
            decisionVar=1; 
            netValue=xTrue-numLoop*cost; 
        elseif quantLow<0 & quantUp<0 
            decisionVar=-1; 
            netValue=0-numLoop*cost; 
        end 
  
        containTrue=0; 
        while containTrue==0 
            if (xTrue-aLoop)<0.00001 
                containTrue=1; 
                aLoop=aLoop; 
                bLoop=bLoop-0.1; 
            elseif (bLoop-xTrue)<0.0001 
                containTrue=1; 
                aLoop=aLoop+0.1; 
                bLoop=bLoop; 
            else 
                changeA=0.1*(bLoop-aLoop)*rand(); 
                changeB=0.1*(bLoop-aLoop)-changeA; 
                aLoopTemp=aLoop+changeA; 
                bLoopTemp=bLoop-changeB; 
                if aLoopTemp<xTrue & xTrue<bLoopTemp 
                    containTrue=1; 
                    aLoop=aLoopTemp; 
                    bLoop=bLoopTemp; 
                end  
            end 
        end 
    end 
    results(iGame,:)=[numLoop decisionVar netValue xTrue]; 
    iGame 
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end 
  
%%  Section 3:  Save results for figures 
[numLoopHist loopTicks]=hist(results(:,1),0:1:50); 
saveOne=[numLoopHist' loopTicks']; 
save('tables1.txt','saveOne','-ascii') 
  
[decisionHist decTicks]=hist(results(:,2),-1:1:1); 
saveTwo=[decisionHist' decTicks']; 
save('tables2.txt','saveTwo','-ascii') 
  
[netHist netTicks]=hist(results(:,3),-0.5:0.1:1); 
saveThree=[netHist' netTicks']; 
save('tables3.txt','saveThree','-ascii') 
  
conditYesLogic=results(:,2)==1; 
conditYes=results(conditYesLogic,:); 
[conditYesHist yesTicks]=hist(conditYes(:,4),-1:0.1:1); 
saveFour=[conditYesHist' yesTicks']; 
save('tables4.txt','saveFour','-ascii') 
  
  
conditNoLogic=results(:,2)==-1; 
conditNo=results(conditNoLogic,:); 
[conditNoHist noTicks]=hist(conditNo(:,4),-1:0.1:1); 
saveFive=[conditNoHist' noTicks']; 
save('tables5.txt','saveFive','-ascii') 
 
 
